A visiting European hydrogeologist has warned that Namibia is operating “blindfolded” when it comes to radiation risks in its groundwater, saying the country has never conducted a centralised survey to measure radionuclides in its aquifers.
Speaking at a public talk in Windhoek on 30 August 2022, Czech mining engineer and hydrogeologist Jan Fajgl said the absence of baseline data leaves both regulators and communities vulnerable.
His lecture, titled Uranium Exploration: Ecology, Radiation and Safety, focused heavily on the Stampriet Artesian Basin, a critical groundwater source for southern Namibia.
To explain the risk, Fajgl began by clarifying what radionuclides are. He described them as naturally radioactive atoms found in rocks, soil and groundwater, particularly in areas with uranium.
As these atoms decay over time, they release radiation. Common examples include uranium, radon and radium.
Fajgl noted that although these radioactive particles are microscopic, their effects accumulate over time.
When their concentrations in drinking water exceed safe levels, they can affect people, livestock, and crops.
Fajgl stressed that, despite the presence of uranium-bearing geology in parts of Namibia, the country has never conducted a dedicated groundwater radionuclide survey.
He pointed out that over a century of research has been conducted on the basin, starting with hydrogeological assessments in 1915, the extensive Water Quality Map Project between 1968 and 1981, and a Japanese-funded evaluation in 2002.
None of these studies measured radionuclides. He said that essential parameters such as arsenic, cyanide and radioactivity are still not measured in areas where they may naturally occur. The only known radionuclide tests in the basin were commissioned privately by Headspring Investments for a uranium project, with samples sent abroad for laboratory analysis.
There is no record of a NamWater-led or government-backed study.
Drawing on guidance from the World Health Organisation, Fajgl explained that naturally occurring radionuclides in groundwater often deliver higher radiation doses than those from artificial sources.
Near uranium ore bodies, groundwater may contain radon, uranium, radium and radioactive lead, sometimes at levels above drinking-water standards. Without baseline measurements, Namibia has no way of knowing which boreholes are safe, how radionuclide concentrations change over time or how exploration and drilling might affect the aquifer.
Fajgl also noted that Namibia’s groundwater is already under stress. Previous NamWater evaluations found pollution in boreholes supplying at least 16 towns, as well as in 17 water schemes serving police stations, schools and other institutions. These assessments highlighted issues such as high levels of sodium, nitrate, fluoride, and other chemicals, often from human activity. However, radionuclides, which could also be present, were not tested at all. According to Fajgl, “When you do not test for radiation, you will not find it,” and he warned that this absence of testing does not guarantee safety.
He contrasted Namibia’s gap with international practice. In the United States, strict testing under the Safe Drinking Water Act is supported by a nationwide network of certified laboratories that analyse radionuclides. Namibia has no such infrastructure. Fajgl emphasised that the country lacks a certified national laboratory, a mapped radiation-risk profile of its aquifers, routine borehole monitoring or regulations aligned with WHO radiation limits. WHO recommends 0.5 Bq/L for gross alpha and 1 Bq/L for gross beta radiation in drinking water, but Namibia has never surveyed to determine its groundwater status relative to these benchmarks.
Fajgl argued that Namibia urgently needs to establish clear radiation standards, establish a certified national laboratory, conduct a large-scale survey of underground water for radionuclides, and identify safe boreholes and high-risk zones. He said continuous, long-term monitoring and strict intake protocols should follow. These measures, he added, are basic safeguards in countries with uranium industries.
He closed with a warning that contamination cannot be reversed without knowing the aquifer’s original conditions. After mining ends, groundwater must be restored to its natural state; without baseline measurements, it will be scientifically impossible to determine the aquifer’s original radionuclide levels.
“Without knowing the original radionuclide levels,” he said, “you cannot detect contamination, you cannot monitor it, and you cannot restore the aquifer to what it was. You cannot restore what you never measured.”
