As Anglo American prepares to sell its 85 per cent stake in De Beers, Africa’s diamond-producing nations find themselves at a crossroads.
For over a century, De Beers has shaped the trajectory of the continent’s most storied resource—from the early discoveries along the Orange River to the global monopoly that once set the price of every diamond mined in Africa. Now, as ownership shifts, a question older than independence resurfaces: can Africa buy back its own diamonds?
The continent remains the heartbeat of the global diamond supply. According to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) Annual Global Summary 2024, African producers collectively mined approximately 57 million carats of rough diamonds, valued at over US$5 billion.
Angola (14 million carats, worth US $1.41 billion) and Botswana (18 million carats, worth US $1.36 billion) led the continent by value and volume, respectively, followed by Namibia’s high-value marine output of nearly US $1 billion and South Africa’s production worth US $662 million. Smaller but significant producers such as Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone together added about US $500 million.
At the same time, a group of West and Central African nations—Ghana, Guinea, CAR, Liberia, Cameroon, and Côte d’Ivoire—contributed around US $50 million.
Collectively, these figures—drawn from the UN-mandated Kimberley Process, which tracks and certifies all legitimate diamond production—show that Africa still accounts for nearly 70 per cent of global rough-diamond value.
For decades, De Beers has stood at the centre of this value chain. Its influence stretched from Botswana’s Orapa and Jwaneng pits to Namibia’s offshore deposits and South Africa’s kimberlite fields. But that dominance has eroded as producing countries renegotiated terms once thought immutable.
Botswana, through its Okavango Diamond Company, now sells part of its allocation directly to the market. Namibia, through Namdeb Holdings, a joint venture with De Beers, has expanded local cutting, polishing, and trading. Angola has overhauled Endiama and Sodiam to attract new investment and curb the outflow of uncut stones. Even smaller players like Lesotho and Zimbabwe have pressed for greater beneficiation.
Anglo American’s divestment has thus reignited an idea once dismissed as aspirational: that Africa’s producing nations could unite in a single investment bloc to purchase or control a majority stake in De Beers. Economists and industry strategists point out that, taken together, these countries generate diamond revenues that could underwrite such a move.
In 2024 alone, the continent’s diamond output exceeded US$5 billion, with Botswana, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa ranking among the top 10 global producers by value. A coalition leveraging sovereign wealth funds, national mining companies, and export earnings could—at least theoretically—mount a credible bid.
Whether such unity is possible remains uncertain. De Beers’ valuation is expected to fall between US$4 billion and US$6 billion, a figure within reach of combined African capital but politically complex. Aligning diverse fiscal policies, regulatory systems, and governance models would test even the most ambitious partnership. Still, the concept of a Pan-African Diamond Investment Consortium resonates strongly at a time when resource nationalism is reshaping the continent’s mining landscape once again.
Supporters argue that ownership is the missing link in Africa’s diamond equation. For decades, the continent exported raw stones but imported luxury. By controlling a share of De Beers, producing countries could influence marketing, branding, and downstream integration—the areas where the most significant value lies. Botswana’s existing co-marketing deal already demonstrates the shift: half of De Beers’ global sorting and valuation now happens in Gaborone rather than London, a quiet but profound reversal of history.
Namibia, too, has set precedents. Through Namdeb Holdings and Debmarine Namibia, it has established a model for state-private collaboration in marine diamond recovery, combining advanced technology with local ownership. Similar frameworks could underpin a broader continental alliance, ensuring that beneficiation, skills transfer, and employment gains stay within African economies.
Beyond economics, the Kimberley Process statistics highlight the geopolitical weight of Africa’s producers. While Russia remains the single largest exporter by volume, Africa’s combined output rivals—and in value terms, surpasses—that of any other region. The continent’s share of global trade thus carries leverage not only in markets but also in negotiations over ethical sourcing and climate-aligned supply chains, both of which now shape international diamond demand.
Whether or not an African-led consortium ever buys De Beers, the symbolism of the debate is clear. The question is no longer whether African countries can produce diamonds—they already dominate production—but whether they can determine the terms of their trade, from mine to market. As Anglo American prepares to exit and global investors circle, Africa’s producers hold more than stones in their hands; they have the opportunity to rewrite a century-old story.
